The British Economy and the State: From Post-War Consensus to Austerity to Whatever This Is

The British Economy and the State: From Post-War Consensus to Austerity to Whatever This Is

Keynesianism, Thatcherism, New Labour, the Financial Crisis, Austerity, Trussonomics, and the Search for a Growth Model That Actually Works

The British Economy: A Success Story Told From a Declining Relative Position

The United Kingdom has the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, depending on the measure and the exchange rate on the day you check. It has higher GDP per capita than France, Germany, Italy, or Japan by some measures and lower by others. Its productivity — output per hour worked — is lower than that of most comparable economies and has been since at least the 1970s, a period long enough to suggest the problem is structural rather than cyclical. Its regional inequality — the gap between London and the South East and the rest of the country — is among the highest in the developed world. Its housing costs relative to incomes are among the highest in Europe. And its economic growth since 2008 has been slower than most comparable economies, interrupted by the financial crisis, delayed by austerity, disrupted by Brexit, and damaged by a pandemic.

The political response to these observations is typically to dispute the baseline, challenge the comparisons, attribute the difficulties to external factors beyond domestic control, and announce a new growth strategy. The growth strategy is announced with the regularity of a seasonal event and has, so far, not produced the sustained productivity improvement that each strategy identifies as its objective. This is not for want of trying. It may be for want of doing the things that trying actually requires.

The Post-War Consensus: Keynesianism, the Mixed Economy, and Its Undoing

The post-war economic settlement — the mixed economy of nationalised industries, Keynesian demand management, full employment as a policy objective, and the welfare state as the social foundation — held from approximately 1945 to 1976, when the IMF crisis forced the Callaghan government to abandon demand management and apply for a £2.3 billion bailout conditional on spending cuts. The moment was symbolically decisive: the Keynesian consensus that had governed British economic policy for thirty years was visibly broken, and the question of what would replace it was about to be answered by the 1979 election.

Thatcherism — monetarism, privatisation, trade union legislation, deregulation, and the explicit rejection of full employment as a policy target — remade the British economic landscape between 1979 and 1990. The privatisations of British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways, British Steel, and the utilities transferred significant public assets to private ownership, raising revenue and eliminating public sector borrowing requirements. The trade union legislation reduced industrial action substantially. The City of London’s Big Bang deregulation of 1986 transformed financial services into Britain’s dominant export industry. The costs — deindustrialisation, mass unemployment peaking at over three million, and regional devastation in former mining and manufacturing communities — were distributed unequally and are, in those communities, not forgotten.

New Labour, the Boom, and the Crash

Tony Blair’s government inherited a Thatcherite settlement that it largely accepted — Bank of England independence, privatisation maintained, flexible labour markets preserved — and added increased public spending from 2000 onward, funded by a tax take that grew with the economy. The Bank of England‘s independence in 1997 was the most significant institutional reform and has broadly been judged successful: inflation was kept close to target for most of the following decade, interest rates were set by Monetary Policy Committee rather than Chancellor, and the politicisation of monetary decisions was substantially reduced.

The 2008 financial crisis ended the boom with a force that the regulatory framework — which had prided itself on “light touch” supervision of financial services — had not anticipated and arguably enabled. Gordon Brown’s immediate response — bank bailouts, fiscal stimulus, G20 coordination — is widely credited by economists with preventing a depression. The subsequent deficit it created became the defining frame of the 2010 election and the justification for a decade of austerity that has not produced the growth dividend its architects promised.

Trussonomics: The Forty-Five Day Experiment in Unfunded Optimism

The brief economic policy of Liz Truss’s government — £45 billion of unfunded tax cuts announced without Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts, mortgage rates rising sharply, the pound falling to near-parity with the dollar, pension funds requiring Bank of England intervention to prevent collapse — was described by economists across the political spectrum as a significant policy error, by markets as a significant policy error, and by the government as a significant policy error approximately three weeks after implementation. Kwasi Kwarteng was replaced as Chancellor. Truss resigned. The entire episode took forty-five days and cost UK mortgage holders an estimated £11 billion in additional interest costs over the following years.

The Office for Budget Responsibility, whose forecasts were bypassed, had the quiet satisfaction of being vindicated without being permitted to say so publicly, which is the civil service equivalent of a pointed silence. The episode demonstrated, with unusual clarity, that market confidence in fiscal sustainability is not an abstract concept but a material constraint on government economic policy — a lesson that had been available from multiple previous examples and was apparently still capable of being learned.

The Search for a Growth Model: Industrial Strategy, Levelling Up, and Mission-Led Government

Post-austerity, post-Brexit, post-pandemic, British economic policy has been searching for a growth model with the focused desperation of someone who has mislaid their keys and is now checking the same pockets repeatedly. Industrial strategy — targeted government support for key sectors — was introduced under May, abolished under Johnson on the grounds that it was too interventionist, reintroduced in modified form by Sunak, and relaunched under Starmer as “mission-led government,” a framing that prioritises long-term objectives over short-term political cycles and which everyone agrees in principle and nobody has yet demonstrated in practice over a period long enough to assess.

The structural challenges remain: low productivity, regional inequality, insufficient housing, inadequate infrastructure, and a public service quality deficit that decades of underfunding have created and that cannot be resolved without either significantly higher taxation or significantly higher growth or both. The political difficulty of each option is well understood. The political consequences of addressing none of them are also becoming clearer.

Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!

The UK has the fifth or sixth largest economy globally by GDP, but with productivity levels below most comparable economies and significant regional inequality. The post-war Keynesian consensus was abandoned following the 1976 IMF crisis. Thatcherism — privatisation, monetary policy, trade union reform, financial deregulation — reshaped the economy from 1979. Bank of England independence was granted in 1997. The 2008 financial crisis produced bank bailouts, a fiscal deficit, and the subsequent decade of austerity under coalition and Conservative governments. The Truss-Kwarteng mini-budget of September 2022 triggered a gilt market crisis, required Bank of England intervention, and ended both their tenures within weeks. The Office for Budget Responsibility provides independent fiscal forecasts. The Starmer government has adopted a “mission-led” growth strategy focused on clean energy, the NHS, education, safety, and opportunity.

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