2018 – Government Unveils Brexit Plan Written in Invisible Ink

2018 – Government Unveils Brexit Plan Written in Invisible Ink

Chequers Agreement Pleases Nobody, Resignations Follow With Impressive Punctuality

Government Unveils Brexit Plan Written in Invisible Ink

Chequers Agreement Pleases Nobody, Resignations Follow With Impressive Punctuality

In July 2018, the Cabinet assembled at Chequers, the Prime Minister’s country residence, for a meeting whose purpose was to agree a common Brexit position that the government would take into the final phase of EU withdrawal negotiations. They arrived by car; their phones were confiscated to prevent leaks; they were presented with a document whose contents had been prepared in Downing Street and whose adoption was, May’s team hoped, a fait accompli that the assembled ministers would accept as the practical resolution of an argument that had been conducted for two years without resolution.

The Chequers plan — a proposal for a common rulebook with the EU on goods and agricultural products, while diverging on services and immigration — was designed to square the circle between the single market access that British business required and the regulatory independence that the Leave vote had been interpreted as demanding. It was, in the estimation of its architects, the pragmatic middle ground between the hard Brexit that the Conservative Eurosceptic wing demanded and the soft Brexit that would have respected the economic relationship while redefining the political one.

The Eurosceptic wing did not agree that it was the pragmatic middle ground. The EU did not agree that it was the basis for a workable agreement. The parliamentary opposition did not agree that it was a sufficient basis for a parliamentary majority. The plan that was supposed to end the argument became, instead, the occasion for a fresh round of it — delivered, in the July heat, with the specific intensity of people who had been arguing about the same thing for two years and had not yet produced a resolution that the available parties could accept.

The Resignations: A Cascade of Departures

David Davis resigned as Brexit Secretary on 8 July 2018, two days after the Chequers agreement, on the grounds that the plan would make it impossible to negotiate a clean Brexit and that he could not in good conscience implement a policy he fundamentally disagreed with. Davis had been Brexit Secretary since the department’s creation in 2016 and had spent two years in a role that gave him nominal responsibility for the negotiations while the actual negotiating authority was concentrated in Downing Street — an arrangement that his resignation statement made clear he had found as frustrating as his critics had always suspected.

Boris Johnson resigned as Foreign Secretary on 9 July, citing his conviction that Britain was heading toward a Brexit that left it a colony of the EU — a phrase of characteristic Johnsonian excess that was also a characteristic Johnsonian statement of genuine political disagreement, delivered in the form of the memorable image that would be repeated in campaign contexts rather than the nuanced analysis that the actual policy questions required.

The resignations were significant not as departures — both Davis and Johnson were replaced quickly — but as declarations of the political terrain that the Conservative Party’s post-Chequers landscape contained. The men who had resigned were not leaving politics. They were positioning themselves for the argument about Brexit’s direction that the Chequers agreement had not resolved and that the parliamentary vote on the Withdrawal Agreement would eventually bring to a head. Johnson in particular was positioning for the leadership contest that May’s failure to pass her deal was already being widely predicted to produce.

Dominic Raab and the Consecutive Resignations

Dominic Raab, who replaced Davis as Brexit Secretary in July, resigned in November — having negotiated the Withdrawal Agreement that he then resigned over, a sequence of events whose specific irony he acknowledged without allowing it to prevent the resignation. Raab’s objection was to the Northern Ireland backstop — the provision that would keep Northern Ireland aligned with EU rules to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland in the event that a future trade agreement was not concluded within the transition period. The backstop was, in Raab’s analysis, a trap: once triggered, there was no guaranteed mechanism for leaving it, which meant that Britain could find itself indefinitely bound to EU rules without any recourse to the democratic mechanisms that the withdrawal was supposed to restore.

The backstop was the most contentious single element of the Withdrawal Agreement and the element that the European Research Group of Conservative MPs — the Eurosceptic caucus led by Jacob Rees-Mogg that had become the most organised internal opposition to May’s Brexit approach — identified as the reason the deal was unacceptable. The backstop had been the EU’s solution to a problem — the Northern Ireland border — that the Leave campaign had specifically declined to address during the referendum campaign and had assumed would be manageable through the goodwill of the parties and the availability of technological solutions that did not, as yet, exist.

The Withdrawal Agreement and Parliamentary Mathematics

The Withdrawal Agreement was published in November 2018, producing the reactions that Chequers had generated — the Eurosceptic wing found it insufficiently Brexit, the Remain wing found it insufficiently moderate, the DUP found the Northern Ireland provisions an unacceptable threat to the constitutional integrity of the union, and the Labour opposition found in it sufficient objections to justify voting against it without specifying clearly what it would accept instead.

The parliamentary arithmetic confronting May was, by any measure, the most challenging faced by a government attempting to pass significant legislation in the modern era. Her majority — dependent on DUP confidence and supply, already strained by the Northern Ireland provisions — was insufficient without winning votes from the Labour benches. The Labour benches were not available to be won because winning them required modifications to the agreement that the EU would not accept and that the Conservative Eurosceptics would resist on different grounds. The circle was not squareable by any arithmetical operation available to the parliamentary system.

The first meaningful vote — scheduled for December 2018, postponed when it became clear the government would lose by a margin of historic proportions, eventually held in January 2019 — produced a defeat of 230 votes, the largest government defeat in parliamentary history. The agreement had been rejected. May was still Prime Minister. Brexit had not been delivered. The year 2018 ended with the political system in a condition that the constitutional theorists described with careful analytical language and that the participants in it described with language they would not repeat in front of children.

The Country Underneath the Politics

The sustained Brexit crisis of 2017 and 2018 occupied the foreground of British political life with a completeness that made the country underneath it — the NHS struggling with winter pressures, the housing crisis deepening, the social care system approaching structural crisis, the productivity problem that had been identified after 2008 and had not been resolved — feel like background noise rather than foreground crisis, which was a distortion of relative importance whose consequences were felt in the communities that were living through the background noise rather than following the foreground argument.

Theresa May governed a country that was, by the measures of its public services and its economic performance and its social infrastructure, in need of significant policy attention, while spending the majority of her administrative and political energy on the management of a constitutional process whose resolution kept receding and whose parliamentary management was consuming resources that the country underneath had legitimate claims on. This is not a criticism of May’s intentions. It is a description of the specific cost of the Brexit crisis — not just its economic costs, which were real, but its opportunity costs, which were the policy attention and political capital that the crisis absorbed and that the problems underneath it did not receive.

Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!

The Chequers meeting of 6 July 2018 produced a Brexit plan proposing a common rulebook with the EU on goods while diverging on services and immigration. David Davis resigned as Brexit Secretary on 8 July; Boris Johnson resigned as Foreign Secretary on 9 July. Dominic Raab was appointed Brexit Secretary in July and resigned in November over the Northern Ireland backstop provisions. The Withdrawal Agreement was published on 14 November 2018. The first meaningful vote on the Agreement was postponed in December 2018 when it became clear the government faced defeat; the vote in January 2019 produced a loss of 230 votes, the largest government defeat in parliamentary history. May’s deal was defeated three times in total. She resigned as Conservative leader in May 2019.

ORIGINALY PUBLISHED: 6 July 2018 (London, UK)

3 thoughts on “2018 – Government Unveils Brexit Plan Written in Invisible Ink”

  1. London is the only city where the phrase “mind the gap” applies to both the train and the growing chasm between your expectations and reality.

  2. My mate’s a broadcasting executive and he said the problem with The London Prat is it’s making audiences realize media institutional analysis deliberately avoids obvious truths.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *