Anglo-French Supersonic Aircraft Takes Off, Arrives at Destination Before the Budget
Concorde Proves Britain Can Still Build Very Expensive Hope
Anglo-French Supersonic Aircraft Takes Off, Arrives at Destination Before the Budget
On 2 March 1969, a white dart of extraordinary elegance lifted off from Toulouse, broke the sound barrier, and demonstrated to the world that Britain and France two nations with a thousand-year history of mutual suspicion, periodic warfare, and competitive condescension could, when sufficiently motivated by national pride and Cold War anxiety, build something genuinely magnificent together.
Concorde was magnificent. This must be stated plainly and without irony, because the satirical opportunities presented by its cost overruns, its limited commercial viability, and the decades of political argument surrounding its development are real and will receive their due, but they should not obscure the fundamental fact that Concorde was one of the most beautiful and technically extraordinary machines ever built, and that it flew from London to New York in three and a half hours, and that nothing built since has improved on this, which is its own kind of indictment of everything that came after.
The plane was brilliant. The programme was, by conventional measures of public expenditure, an act of collective financial optimism that made the Millennium Dome look like a prudent investment. Both things are true. Concorde contains multitudes.
The Origins: Pride, Politics, and the Sound Barrier
The Anglo-French supersonic transport agreement was signed in November 1962 the same year Britain applied to join the European Community, the same year the Beatles signed to EMI, a year of considerable British forward momentum that would subsequently be tested by events. The agreement bound both governments to the development of a supersonic passenger aircraft, notably without any provision for either side to withdraw, a detail that would become significant when the costs began their energetic upward revision.
The motivations were various and variously acknowledged. Commercially, there was a genuine belief that supersonic passenger travel was the future that airlines would want it, that passengers would pay for it, that the market for rapid transatlantic travel was large enough to support a fleet of supersonic aircraft operated by the world’s major carriers. This belief was, it would transpire, optimistic in the specific way that technological enthusiasm tends to be optimistic: correct about the technology, wrong about the economics.
Politically, the motivations were clearer. Britain and France were both confronting the uncomfortable reality that American aerospace dominance Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed was reshaping the commercial aviation market in ways that left European manufacturers at the margins. The Soviet Union was developing its own supersonic transport, the Tupolev Tu-144, with the competitive enthusiasm that characterised Soviet technological programmes in this period. If the West was going to have a supersonic aircraft, it was going to be built in Bristol and Toulouse, or it was going to be built in Seattle, and the first option was very considerably preferable from the perspective of both governments, regardless of what it cost.
The Cost: A Number That Kept Getting Larger
The original estimate for Concorde’s development was £170 million, shared between Britain and France. The final development cost was approximately £1.3 billion a ratio of actual to estimated expenditure that established a benchmark for major British infrastructure projects that has been energetically maintained by every subsequent generation of engineers, project managers, and optimistic Treasury officials.
The cost overrun was not the result of incompetence, exactly. It was the result of attempting something that had never been done before, which has a tendency to produce surprises. Supersonic flight at twice the speed of sound generates heat that conventional aluminium cannot withstand Concorde’s skin reached 127 degrees Celsius in cruise, which required special aluminium alloys and titanium components and engineering solutions that had to be invented as the programme proceeded. The sonic boom produced by supersonic flight over land proved incompatible with popular enthusiasm for supersonic flight over land. The fuel consumption was, by subsonic standards, spectacular in the wrong direction.
Each of these discoveries required engineering responses that cost money. The money was spent. The programme continued because the treaty made it impossible to stop, and because stopping it would have been an admission that the whole enterprise had been miscalculated, which it had, but which no government finds easy to say out loud.
The First Flight: Three Minutes of Vindication
When test pilot André Turcat lifted Concorde 001 from the runway at Toulouse on 2 March 1969, he flew for twenty-seven minutes at subsonic speed, landing successfully at the same airport from which he had departed. This was not, by the standards of aviation achievement, an epic journey. It was a first step cautious, controlled, successful and its significance was not in the distance covered but in the proof that the thing could fly at all.
The British prototype, Concorde 002, made its first flight from Filton, Bristol on 9 April 1969. Between the two flights, the project acquired the validation that years of cost overruns and political argument had failed to provide: the aircraft existed, it flew, and it was astonishing to look at.
The drooped nose lowered for takeoff and landing to give the pilots forward visibility obscured by the delta wing configuration, raised in supersonic cruise to its elegant pointed position was the detail that most captured the public imagination. It was a nose that changed shape depending on what the aircraft was doing, which was, in the late 1960s, an idea sufficiently futuristic to feel like science fiction rendered in aluminium.
Britain’s Technological Confidence: A Brief Survey
Concorde was the apex of a postwar tradition of British technological ambition that had produced, alongside its triumphs, an instructive collection of expensive disappointments. The de Havilland Comet had been the world’s first commercial jet airliner, entering service in 1952 before a series of catastrophic metal fatigue failures grounded the fleet and allowed Boeing’s 707 to define the jet age instead. The TSR-2 strike aircraft, cancelled in 1965, was by many accounts technically superior to the American aircraft that replaced it, a fact that provided considerable consolation to precisely nobody except the engineers who had built it.
Britain could build brilliant aircraft. Britain had more difficulty turning brilliant aircraft into commercial programmes, which requires a combination of technical excellence, market realism, production efficiency, and sustained political commitment that the British aerospace industry had not consistently managed to assemble simultaneously.
Concorde was the grandest expression of this pattern the most brilliant, the most beautiful, the most expensive, and the most instructive. It entered commercial service in January 1976, operating routes between London and New York and London and Bahrain, carrying passengers who were prepared to pay premium prices for the experience of arriving before the clock said they had left. It operated for twenty-seven years. It carried around 2.5 million passengers. It never made a commercial profit.
What Concorde Meant: Speed as National Statement
The desire to fly faster than sound is not, at its root, a commercial calculation. It is a statement about human ambition, about what nations can achieve when they decide to attempt the difficult, about the relationship between engineering and aspiration. Concorde was built in the same decade that put men on the moon, and it shares with the Apollo programme the quality of being a project whose value cannot be fully captured in cost-benefit analysis because its purpose was partly to demonstrate that the thing was possible, and that the people who built it were capable of building it.
For Britain, specifically, Concorde meant something additional. It was built in the years of managed decline, of devaluation and IMF negotiations and the gnomes of Zurich and the slow retreat from empire. It was a daily, flying, sonic-booming refutation of the declinist narrative evidence that the country that had invented the jet engine could still, when it chose to, produce the most technologically advanced commercial aircraft in the world.
Whether it was worth the money is a question that depends on how you value things. The passengers who flew on it valued it enormously. The airlines that operated it valued it less consistently. The Treasury officials who funded it maintained a complicated relationship with the word value for decades. The people of Bristol and Toulouse and the engineers at BAC and Aérospatiale who built it valued it in the way that people value work that exceeds what anyone thought possible when it started.
It flew at twice the speed of sound and the windows were warm to the touch at altitude. It crossed the Atlantic in the time it takes to watch two films. It was the most beautiful machine of the twentieth century’s second half, and it is gone, and nothing has replaced it, and thirty years of hurt is nothing compared to what aviation lost when Concorde’s last flight landed at Heathrow in October 2003.
Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!
Concorde 001 made its maiden flight from Toulouse on 2 March 1969, piloted by André Turcat. Concorde 002 flew from Filton, Bristol on 9 April 1969. The Anglo-French supersonic transport agreement had been signed in November 1962. Development costs rose from an estimated £170 million to approximately £1.3 billion. Concorde entered commercial service in January 1976, operated by British Airways and Air France. It carried approximately 2.5 million passengers across its twenty-seven years of service. The fleet was retired in October 2003 following the Air France crash of July 2000, rising maintenance costs, and a post-September 11 decline in luxury travel. No supersonic passenger aircraft has entered commercial service since.
ORIGINALY PUBLISHED: 2 March 1969 (London, UK)
Alan Nafzger was born in Lubbock, Texas, the son Swiss immigrants. He grew up on a dairy in Windthorst, north central Texas. He earned degrees from Midwestern State University (B.A. 1985) and Texas State University (M.A. 1987). University College Dublin (Ph.D. 1991). Dr. Nafzger has entertained and educated young people in Texas colleges for 37 years. Nafzger is best known for his dark novels and experimental screenwriting. His best know scripts to date are Lenin’s Body, produced in Russia by A-Media and Sea and Sky produced in The Philippines in the Tagalog language. In 1986, Nafzger wrote the iconic feminist western novel, Gina of Quitaque. He currently lives in Holloway, North London. Contact: [email protected]
