How Leaving the EU Revealed Everything the British Constitution Had Been Quietly Assuming for Forty-Seven Years
Brexit: The Constitutional Stress Test Nobody Ordered
On 23 June 2016, 51.9% of those who voted in the UK’s EU membership referendum chose to leave. This result — the product of a campaign characterised by significant misinformation on both sides, a franchise that excluded EU citizens resident in the UK and most sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, and a question whose implications were not specified on the ballot paper — set in motion the most constitutionally disruptive period in British politics since the English Civil War, and rather more paperwork than that.
Brexit did not create the UK’s constitutional vulnerabilities. It revealed them. The uncodified constitution, parliamentary sovereignty, royal prerogative, the devolution settlements, the relationship between domestic and international law, the role of the courts — all of these questions, which had been managed through convention and institutional goodwill, were stress-tested simultaneously. Several conventions did not survive the testing. Several institutions found themselves in territory for which no map existed. Several politicians discovered that constitutional constraints are real things rather than suggestions.
The Road to the Referendum: A Decision Nobody Wanted Becomes Unavoidable
David Cameron’s decision to promise an in/out referendum in his 2013 Bloomberg speech was a response to specific political pressures: the rise of UKIP, Conservative backbench Euroscepticism, and the calculation that a referendum won would settle the European question for a generation. The calculation was based on the reasonable assumption that Remain would win. It did not. The subsequent constitutional crisis was, in this sense, the consequence of a political gamble in which the stakes had not been adequately assessed — a category of governmental decision that has provided political scientists with material for decades.
The Electoral Commission’s documentation of the 2016 referendum records the conduct of a campaign in which the official Leave campaign was subsequently fined for breaching spending limits and the official Remain campaign conducted what critics described as “Project Fear” with insufficient attention to the legitimate concerns driving Leave support. Both characterisations are broadly fair and wholly insufficient as explanations for the result.
The Constitutional Crisis of 2016-2020: Parliament, the Courts, and the Limits of Everyone
The period between the referendum result and the UK’s formal departure from the EU on 31 January 2020 constitutes one of the most constitutionally eventful periods in modern British history. The key events:
Miller I (2017): The Supreme Court ruled 8-3 that Article 50 could not be triggered by royal prerogative alone — Parliament must authorise it. Parliament authorised it. The government characterised this as complying with the ruling. Constitutionalists noted that triggering Article 50 without understanding what Brexit would look like was authorising something whose content remained undefined.
The Meaningful Vote (2019): Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement was defeated in the Commons three times — by margins of 230, 149, and 58 votes — the largest government defeats in parliamentary history. This was democracy functioning as intended (Parliament scrutinising and rejecting an executive proposal) and simultaneously producing an impasse the constitutional machinery had no mechanism to resolve.
Prorogation (2019): Boris Johnson’s government prorogued Parliament for five weeks at the height of the constitutional crisis. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the prorogation was unlawful. Parliament was recalled. The government expressed displeasure. The Miller II judgment established that the executive cannot use prorogation to frustrate Parliament’s constitutional function — a principle that ought to have been obvious and was apparently not.
The Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework: The Settlement That Required Three Names
The most constitutionally complex element of Brexit’s aftermath was the arrangements for Northern Ireland. The open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland — established under the Good Friday Agreement and maintained through common EU membership — could not survive Brexit unchanged. If Northern Ireland aligned with UK regulatory standards, a customs border would be required on the island of Ireland, threatening the peace process. If it aligned with EU standards, a customs border would be required in the Irish Sea, which unionists argued undermined Northern Ireland’s position within the UK.
The Withdrawal Agreement resolved this by creating regulatory checks on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland — the “Irish Sea border” — while maintaining Northern Ireland’s access to the EU single market. Johnson signed this agreement, described it as beneficial, subsequently described it as a problem he would fix, and introduced the Internal Market Bill containing clauses that would have breached the Withdrawal Agreement in “a specific and limited way” — in the words of his own Northern Ireland Secretary, who appeared not to appreciate the extent to which admitting you intend to break international law in Parliament is an unusual thing to do.
The Protocol was subsequently renegotiated as the Windsor Framework under Rishi Sunak — an agreement that reduced but did not eliminate the practical consequences of the Irish Sea border, was accepted by most unionists as an improvement, rejected by the DUP for a year before they accepted it, and described by the government as a decisive resolution of the Northern Ireland question. The Windsor Framework documentation is available for those who wish to assess this claim.
Repatriated Sovereignty: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality
Brexit was sold substantially on the promise of “taking back control” — of laws, borders, and trade. The constitutional reality of returned sovereignty is more textured. The UK has formal sovereignty over its laws. It also has trade agreements that constrain its regulatory freedom, security arrangements requiring compliance with international standards, a financial services sector operating under equivalence frameworks with the EU, and a supply chain for goods and services substantially integrated with European partners. Sovereignty, in the twenty-first century, is not a binary condition. It is a negotiation. Brexit changed the terms of the negotiation more than it changed the underlying structure of interdependence.
The long-term constitutional consequences are still accruing. The devolution settlements have been strained. The constitutional conventions that restrained executive power have been tested and some have not recovered. The relationship between Parliament, courts, and executive that evolved over three centuries is being renegotiated in real time. Brexit was the stress test. The results are still being graded.
Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!
The UK voted 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the European Union in the June 2016 referendum on a 72% turnout. The Article 50 notification was triggered in March 2017 following the Supreme Court’s Miller I ruling that parliamentary authorisation was required. The UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020 and the transition period ended on 31 December 2020. The Withdrawal Agreement included the Northern Ireland Protocol, subsequently renegotiated as the Windsor Framework in 2023. The Internal Market Act 2020 created post-Brexit UK-wide market access rules contested by devolved governments. The Supreme Court’s Miller II judgment (2019) established that the prorogation of Parliament was unlawful. Post-Brexit, the UK remains party to the European Convention on Human Rights and a member of NATO, while having left the EU single market and customs union.
Alan Nafzger was born in Lubbock, Texas, the son Swiss immigrants. He grew up on a dairy in Windthorst, north central Texas. He earned degrees from Midwestern State University (B.A. 1985) and Texas State University (M.A. 1987). University College Dublin (Ph.D. 1991). Dr. Nafzger has entertained and educated young people in Texas colleges for 37 years. Nafzger is best known for his dark novels and experimental screenwriting. His best know scripts to date are Lenin’s Body, produced in Russia by A-Media and Sea and Sky produced in The Philippines in the Tagalog language. In 1986, Nafzger wrote the iconic feminist western novel, Gina of Quitaque. He currently lives in Holloway, North London. Contact: [email protected]

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