Right to Buy, Planning Refusals, Landlordism, Generation Rent, the Bank of Mum and Dad, and the Political Economy of Keeping House Prices High
The Housing Crisis: A Crisis That Is Also a Policy Choice and Also a Source of Electoral Support
Britain’s housing crisis is the most extensively documented, most consistently identified, most persistently unaddressed structural failure in British domestic policy. Its dimensions are familiar: house prices averaging approximately nine times earnings in London and five to seven times elsewhere; a generation of younger adults who will not achieve home ownership without parental wealth transfer; a private rental sector offering insecurity, poor quality, and high cost; a social housing stock at roughly half its 1979 level; and a housebuilding rate that has been below replacement levels for most of the last thirty years. The causes are well understood. The solutions are well understood. The political obstacles are also well understood, which is why the crisis continues and the solutions are announced at regular intervals without being implemented at sufficient scale to resolve it.
The fundamental political economy is this: housing scarcity benefits approximately sixty percent of the electorate who own homes. Their property values are sustained or enhanced by the under-supply that creates the crisis. They vote in higher proportions than non-owners. They are more likely to be concentrated in marginal constituencies. The policies that would resolve the housing crisis — building substantially more homes — would exert downward pressure on the values of homes already owned. The political system produces the housing policy that its voting electorate, rationally self-interested, would select. That policy produces the housing crisis that everyone deplores. This is not a scandal in the sense of wrongdoing. It is a scandal in the sense of a predictable systemic injustice that the system is designed to perpetuate.
Right to Buy: The Policy That Sold Off the Social Housing Stock and Did Not Replace It
The Right to Buy scheme, introduced by the Thatcher government in 1980, gave council tenants the right to purchase their homes at significant discounts — up to thirty to fifty percent below market value. It sold approximately two million council homes over the following four decades, raising revenue for the Treasury, creating homeowners who had previously been renters, and substantially reducing the social housing stock. The receipts from sales were not recycled into replacement social housing at anything approaching one-for-one replacement rates: roughly for every three homes sold under Right to Buy, approximately one was built to replace it.
The consequence — forty years of accumulation — is a social housing stock approximately 1.5 million units smaller than it was in 1979, in a country with approximately fifteen million more people. The homes sold under Right to Buy did not disappear. They are still standing. A significant proportion — approximately forty percent of properties sold under the scheme in London — are now in the private rental sector, rented to social tenants at private rents covered by housing benefit. The government is, in this respect, paying private landlords housing benefit to rent back properties it sold to their previous owners at a discount, which is a circular use of public funds that would be considered satirical if it were not the policy.
Help to Buy: The Scheme That Helped Developers More Than Buyers
Help to Buy — the equity loan scheme introduced by the coalition government in 2013 and ended in 2023 — provided government equity loans to first-time buyers purchasing new-build properties, enabling purchases with five percent deposits. The scheme was designed to help people onto the housing ladder. Its principal effect was to inflate the prices of new-build properties — developers priced Help to Buy properties to extract the government equity, producing prices that were higher with the scheme than without it. The National Audit Office’s review found that approximately forty percent of buyers could have afforded their purchase without the scheme, that prices had risen in response to it, and that the government had accepted a significant financial risk from the equity loans it had issued.
Help to Buy did help some buyers onto the housing ladder. It also helped developers increase their margins, helped existing homeowners in new-build areas see their property values inflate, and helped the government accumulate equity loan liabilities that will be repaid — at the prevailing market values — when buyers repay or sell. Whether the outcome is a good use of public funds depends substantially on whether house prices rise, fall, or stagnate over the repayment period, which is a question that the scheme’s designers could not answer and that markets have not yet conclusively resolved.
Generation Rent: The Cohort That Could Not Afford What Their Parents Were Given
The generation born from approximately 1980 onward — the millennials and Generation Z — have experienced a housing market fundamentally different from their parents’: house prices that have risen far faster than wages since approximately 1997; a private rental sector that absorbs a higher proportion of income than comparable housing costs in any previous generation; deposit requirements that necessitate years of saving at rates that rental costs make difficult to accumulate; and a inheritance wealth transfer that has become a primary mechanism of home ownership, creating a two-tier society in which access to the property market is determined substantially by parental wealth rather than personal income or effort.
The political consequences are visible in the generational voting gap: younger voters are substantially more likely to vote Labour and to support redistributive housing policies. The electoral weight of this cohort has been insufficient to override the policy preferences of homeowning older voters, which is itself a consequence of lower turnout among younger voters — lower turnout that is itself partially a consequence of the sense that the political system does not serve their interests, which is partially true and partially self-fulfilling. The housing crisis, the intergenerational wealth transfer, and the political disengagement of younger voters are not separate phenomena. They are the same phenomenon viewed from different angles.
Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!
House prices average approximately nine times earnings in London and five to seven times elsewhere. The Right to Buy scheme sold approximately two million council homes from 1980; approximately 40% of London properties sold are now in the private rental sector. Social housing stock is approximately 1.5 million units lower than in 1979 in a country with 15 million more people. Help to Buy (2013-2023) inflated new-build prices; the NAO found approximately 40% of buyers could have purchased without the scheme. Private rental costs absorb a higher proportion of younger workers’ income than any previous generation. Younger voters are substantially more likely to support redistributive housing policies but vote at lower rates than older homeowners. The planning system, Right to Buy without replacement, and Help to Buy are all identified as contributors to the housing supply deficit.
Alan Nafzger was born in Lubbock, Texas, the son Swiss immigrants. He grew up on a dairy in Windthorst, north central Texas. He earned degrees from Midwestern State University (B.A. 1985) and Texas State University (M.A. 1987). University College Dublin (Ph.D. 1991). Dr. Nafzger has entertained and educated young people in Texas colleges for 37 years. Nafzger is best known for his dark novels and experimental screenwriting. His best know scripts to date are Lenin’s Body, produced in Russia by A-Media and Sea and Sky produced in The Philippines in the Tagalog language. In 1986, Nafzger wrote the iconic feminist western novel, Gina of Quitaque. He currently lives in Holloway, North London. Contact: [email protected]

London is the only city where you can have a conversation with someone for twenty minutes and learn absolutely nothing about them except their opinion on the tube and their approximate postcode.
The thing about documentation is once something’s written down with this precision, it becomes undeniable evidence. Every council memo becomes a confession of systematic incompetence.