2024 – Election Campaign Offers Voters Fresh Start, Same Damp Ceiling

2024 – Election Campaign Offers Voters Fresh Start, Same Damp Ceiling

Labour Wins Landslide on Votes Nobody Was Especially Enthusiastic About Casting

Election Campaign Offers Voters Fresh Start, Same Damp Ceiling

Labour Wins Landslide on Votes Nobody Was Especially Enthusiastic About Casting

On 4 July 2024, the United Kingdom went to the polls and elected Keir Starmer’s Labour Party with a majority of 174 seats — the second largest since 1945, larger than Blair’s 1997 majority in seats if not in vote share — on a Conservative vote share of 23.7 percent, the lowest since the party’s founding, and on a Labour vote share of 33.7 percent, the lowest on which any government had won an outright majority in British electoral history.

The arithmetic contained within it the specific character of the 2024 election: a landslide produced not by enthusiasm for the winner but by comprehensive rejection of the incumbent, distributed across a fractured opposition landscape in which Reform UK took 14.3 percent of the vote and four seats, the Liberal Democrats took 12.2 percent of the vote and 71 seats, the Greens took 6.7 percent of the vote and four seats, and the remaining parties absorbed the rest of a vote that was, in its aggregate composition, the most fragmented since the Second World War.

The Conservatives lost 251 seats. Liz Truss lost her seat. Rishi Sunak retained his. Jacob Rees-Mogg lost his seat. Grant Shapps, who had held five different Cabinet portfolios in the preceding two years, lost his seat. The scale of the Conservative collapse — from 365 seats in 2019 to 121 in 2024 — represented the most dramatic single-election loss of parliamentary representation that a governing party had experienced in British history, exceeding even Labour’s 1935 collapse and the Liberal Party’s post-1922 disintegration.

Rishi Sunak’s Campaign: The Rain and What It Symbolised

Sunak’s campaign began badly and did not recover. The election announcement on 22 May — Sunak standing in Downing Street in driving rain, the D:Ream Things Can Only Get Better soundtrack playing audibly from a Labour counterdemonstration nearby in a coincidence of such pointed symbolism that it felt less like a coincidence than a production decision — produced an image that the subsequent five weeks did not improve upon. The rain, the song, the Prime Minister appearing slightly drenched in more senses than the meteorological one: it was the election’s defining image before the campaign had begun.

The campaign itself produced the specific drama of the betting scandal — Conservative candidates and party officials being investigated for placing bets on the election date before it was publicly announced — and the specific drama of the debate performances, in which Sunak’s forensic aggression toward Starmer was received by viewers as harrying rather than powerful, and Starmer’s measured non-performance was received as reassuringly un-alarmist rather than uninspiring. The election was not being decided by debate performances. It was being decided by the accumulated record of the preceding five years, against which Sunak’s evident personal competence and intelligence were insufficient counterweights.

Keir Starmer: The Politics of Not Being Boris Johnson

Starmer arrived at Downing Street on 5 July 2024, the day after the election, with a majority of 174 and the specific burden of an electorate that had voted for change without having been especially specific about what change it wanted, which is either the best possible mandate — enormous freedom of action — or the worst possible mandate — no specific public commitment to be held to — depending on one’s theory of democratic accountability.

His cabinet was assembled with the professional thoroughness of a leader who had spent four years in opposition preparing for government and had identified, for each major portfolio, the person considered most likely to deliver competent management of the brief. The appointments were safe rather than bold — reflecting either a government that had learned from New Labour’s early overconfidence or a government that had not been sufficiently bold to justify the expectations that a majority of 174 creates, depending again on one’s theory of what a government with a large majority should do with it.

The inheritance was, as all inheritances are described regardless of their actual condition, difficult: public services depleted by austerity and the pandemic and the cost of living crisis, an economy whose productivity problem had not been resolved in fourteen years of Conservative management, a housing crisis whose severity had been accumulating for three decades, and a fiscal position that the Chancellor Rachel Reeves described as worse than had been disclosed before the election — a characterisation that the Conservatives disputed and that provided the new government with the specific framing of an inherited problem that every incoming government requires and that the specific numbers did or did not support depending on the accounting methodology applied.

Reform UK: The Fragmentation of the Right

Nigel Farage’s return to frontline politics — he had previously led UKIP to the 2016 referendum and then stepped back — as leader of Reform UK and parliamentary candidate for Clacton produced the most significant vote share for a non-mainstream party since the SDP Alliance’s 25 percent in 1983, and produced four MPs on 14.3 percent of the vote, which was the electoral system’s commentary on the justice of the distribution rather than the significance of the achievement.

Reform’s vote was concentrated in the former Red Wall seats — the communities that had voted Conservative in 2019 on the Brexit promise and had concluded, by 2024, that neither Brexit nor the Conservative government that had delivered it had produced the change they had voted for. The three-way split — Labour, Conservative, Reform — in many of these seats produced Labour victories on vote shares that would not have produced victories in a two-party contest, which is the specific gift that the fragmented right gave to Labour’s landslide without intending to.

Farage’s four MPs and 14.3 percent created a political presence that the Conservative Party’s post-election review would be required to address: whether the party’s future lay in absorbing the Reform vote through ideological movement in its direction, or in distinguishing itself from Reform through ideological movement away from it, or in some third option whose nature the available candidates for the Conservative leadership were still in the process of defining.

The End of One Era and the Beginning of Another

The 2024 election was, by the measure of what it ended, the most significant since 1997 — the conclusion of a fourteen-year Conservative period in government that had begun with the coalition’s austerity, had been interrupted by the Brexit crisis, had survived the pandemic, and had been definitively ended by the Partygate legacy, the Truss economic crisis, and the accumulated sense that the party had used up its political credit without producing the transformation its successive mandates had promised.

What it was the beginning of was less certain. Starmer’s Labour had been elected on a mandate of change rather than a specific programme of change, in the manner of governments that win large majorities by being the available alternative to the unacceptable incumbent rather than by inspiring the enthusiasm that large majority governments of the past — Attlee’s 1945, Thatcher’s 1979, Blair’s 1997 — had generated. The available future was genuinely open in a way that the preceding five years’ political determinism — the Conservative majority producing Brexit producing the Withdrawal Agreement producing the pandemic producing Partygate producing the Truss budget producing Sunak’s management — had not been. What the Starmer government would make of the openness was the question that 2024 had asked and that the years following it would answer.

The damp ceiling of 2024 was the specific legacy of the years that preceded it. The question of whether the fresh start would prove fresh was the question that history, which does not hurry, was in the process of answering. The answer, as always, would arrive in due course, and in the meantime Britain continued, which is what Britain does.

Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!

The 2024 general election was held on 4 July. Labour won 412 seats on 33.7 percent of the vote, the lowest vote share on which any government has won an outright majority in British electoral history. The Conservatives won 121 seats on 23.7 percent, their lowest share since the party’s founding. Reform UK won 14.3 percent of the vote and four seats. The Liberal Democrats won 71 seats. Keir Starmer became Prime Minister on 5 July 2024. Liz Truss lost her seat; Jacob Rees-Mogg lost his seat; Rishi Sunak retained his. Nigel Farage won the Clacton constituency for Reform UK. Rachel Reeves became Chancellor and described the inherited fiscal position as worse than disclosed before the election. The Conservatives elected Kemi Badenoch as their new leader in November 2024.

ORIGINALY PUBLISHED: 4 July 2024 (London, UK)

4 thoughts on “2024 – Election Campaign Offers Voters Fresh Start, Same Damp Ceiling”

  1. My mate’s in politics and he said the problem with it is it’s making it impossible for politicians to maintain the pretense that systems work.

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