2003 – Britain Invades Iraq Armed With Dossiers and Stage Confidence

2003 – Britain Invades Iraq Armed With Dossiers and Stage Confidence

Blair Discovers That Being Right About Kosovo Does Not Mean Being Right About Everything

Britain Invades Iraq Armed With Dossiers and Stage Confidence

Blair Discovers That Being Right About Kosovo Does Not Mean Being Right About Everything

On 18 March 2003, the House of Commons voted by 412 to 149 to authorise British military participation in the invasion of Iraq — the largest rebellion of the Blair era, the largest rebellion against a British government on a matter of war in modern history, and the beginning of an episode that would define Tony Blair’s legacy, divide British public opinion more sharply than any foreign policy decision since Suez, and eventually produce a public inquiry of such length and thoroughness that its report, published in 2016, ran to 2.6 million words.

The case for war rested on two propositions: that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction capable of being deployed within forty-five minutes of an order to use them, and that the combination of Saddam Hussein’s regime and this weapons capability represented a threat sufficient to justify military action without a second UN Security Council resolution explicitly authorising force. Both propositions were contested before the war began. Both propositions were, in their essential claims, wrong — the weapons did not exist in the form described, and the legal basis for the war without a second resolution was subsequently judged by the Chilcot Inquiry to have been inadequate.

Blair had been right about Kosovo in 1999. He had been right about Sierra Leone in 2000. His doctrine of humanitarian intervention — the argument that the international community had not merely a right but an obligation to intervene in states where governments were committing atrocities against their own people — had been articulated in a Chicago speech in 1999 with an intellectual clarity and a moral conviction that had made it the most serious foreign policy statement of his premiership. The doctrine was defensible. Its application to Iraq was, in the judgement of subsequent inquiry, not defensible on the terms in which it was applied.

The Dossier: Intelligence, Politics, and the Forty-Five Minutes

The September 2002 dossier — the intelligence assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programme published by the government to make the case for action — contained the claim that Iraq could deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty-five minutes of an order. The claim, derived from a single intelligence source and assessed as credible by the Joint Intelligence Committee, was included in the dossier’s foreword, written by Blair himself, in terms that gave it a prominence the intelligence community had not requested and a certainty that the underlying intelligence did not justify.

Alastair Campbell, Blair’s communications director, had been involved in the dossier’s preparation in ways that the subsequent Hutton Inquiry — established after the death of the government scientist David Kelly, who had been the source of BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan’s claim that the dossier had been sexed up — examined in detail. Hutton’s conclusion that the government had not deliberately misled Parliament was received with the specific scepticism that a conclusion at odds with the available evidence generally receives, and the term Whitewash Wednesday entered the political vocabulary on the day of Hutton’s publication.

David Kelly had been a weapons inspector of genuine distinction, a government scientist who had spent his career working on biological weapons programmes and whose knowledge of the Iraqi situation was more granular than the political commentary on either side of the debate. His death by suicide in July 2003, amid the pressure of the inquiry into the source of Gilligan’s report, was the crisis’s most devastating human consequence and the moment at which the gap between the political management of the intelligence and the human reality of that management became impossible to ignore.

Robin Cook: The Resignation That Mattered

Robin Cook resigned from the Cabinet on 17 March 2003, the night before the Commons vote, delivering a resignation statement that is, alongside Geoffrey Howe’s 1990 speech, the finest piece of resignation oratory in modern British parliamentary history. He argued that the case for war had not been made, that Iraq’s weapons capability did not justify unilateral action outside the UN framework, and that Britain was being asked to participate in a war for reasons that the intelligence did not support and the diplomacy had not exhausted.

Cook was right. This is the settled judgement of the Chilcot Inquiry, of subsequent historical analysis, and of the majority of the British public, whose opposition to the war — expressed in the largest demonstration in British history on 15 February 2003, when approximately one million people marched through London against the planned invasion — proved more accurate in its strategic assessment than the intelligence on which the government’s decision rested.

The February 15 march was, in its scale and its diversity, unlike anything that British political protest had previously produced — not the student radicals of 1968 but ordinary people, of all ages and backgrounds, who had concluded that the case for war had not been made and who expressed that conclusion by walking through London in numbers that made the conclusion visible in ways that letters to their MPs could not. Blair went ahead with the war. The demonstration did not stop it. Demonstrations rarely stop wars. They record, with the accuracy of mass participation, the judgement of a society on a decision it has been asked to accept, and the record stands against the decision in the historical account that follows.

The War and Its Conduct

The military campaign was, by conventional measures, a rapid success. British forces, operating in the south of Iraq around Basra, secured their objectives within weeks. Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed. Baghdad fell. The statue in Firdos Square was pulled down. The mission that had been authorised — the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the destruction of the weapons that had justified the mission — was accomplished, except that the weapons had not been there to destroy, which transformed the accomplished mission into something considerably more complicated.

The post-invasion planning — or rather the absence of post-invasion planning commensurate with the military operation — was the subject of considerable criticism in the Chilcot Report and of considerable suffering for the people of Iraq, whose country descended into the sectarian violence and insurgency that those who had opposed the war had predicted and those who had supported it had inadequately planned for. The British military presence in Basra lasted until 2009, ending in circumstances that the Chilcot Inquiry described with diplomatic understatement and that the military participants described rather more directly in the accounts they gave to subsequent investigations.

Blair’s Legacy: The Iraq Distortion

The Iraq War distorted Tony Blair’s legacy in ways that the historical record does not entirely justify but that political memory reliably produces. A Prime Minister who had delivered devolution, the Good Friday Agreement, Bank of England independence, the minimum wage, significant public service investment, two landslide election victories, and interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone that saved lives, is remembered primarily for a war that was wrong in its intelligence basis, legally questionable in its authority, and catastrophic in its consequences for Iraq and for British credibility in the Middle East.

The Chilcot Report, published in July 2016 after seven years of inquiry, concluded that the decision to go to war had been made before the peaceful options had been exhausted, that the intelligence had been presented with more certainty than the evidence warranted, and that the planning for the post-invasion period had been wholly inadequate. It stopped short of concluding that Blair had deliberately deceived Parliament or the public. It did conclude that he had been wrong, and that the wrongness had consequences that a more cautious, more sceptical, more questioning approach to the available intelligence might have avoided.

Blair continued to argue that he had made the decision he genuinely believed was right on the basis of the intelligence available to him, and that removing Saddam Hussein was correct regardless of the weapons. This argument has not persuaded those who opposed the war and is unlikely to do so. It is, however, a genuine account of how a Prime Minister can make a catastrophic mistake while acting in good conscience with the information he has — which is, perhaps, the most important lesson about the relationship between intelligence, politics, and the decisions that change history.

Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!

The House of Commons voted by 412 to 149 on 18 March 2003 to authorise British participation in the invasion of Iraq, the largest rebellion against the government on a matter of war in modern history. The September 2002 intelligence dossier claimed Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes; no such weapons were found. Robin Cook resigned from the Cabinet on 17 March 2003 and delivered a resignation speech widely regarded as the finest parliamentary statement of opposition to the war. Approximately one million people marched against the war in London on 15 February 2003. David Kelly, a government weapons scientist, died by suicide in July 2003 amid the controversy over the intelligence dossier. The Hutton Inquiry into Kelly’s death reported in January 2004. The Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War reported in July 2016 after seven years of investigation, running to 2.6 million words. British forces withdrew from Basra in 2009.

ORIGINALY PUBLISHED: 18 March 2003 (London, UK)

3 thoughts on “2003 – Britain Invades Iraq Armed With Dossiers and Stage Confidence”

  1. The thing about partners frustrated with The London Prat obsession is they’re essentially saying “my significant other has replaced conversation with satire.”

  2. This is what happens when someone documents British institutional dysfunction with precision instead of resorting to vague complaining.

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