Brexit’s Consequences, the EU Reset, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Youth Mobility, Horizon, the Single Market Gap, and the Political Economy of Not Quite Going Back
The Relationship Status: It’s Complicated, and Both Parties Know It
Britain left the European Union on 31 January 2020. It has been negotiating with the European Union on the terms and conditions of the relationship ever since, in a process that has produced the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the Windsor Framework, the restored Horizon association, a defence and security partnership, and ongoing discussions about youth mobility, veterinary agreements, and data adequacy — a body of engagement that is, in functional terms, the closest possible relationship with the EU that is politically describable as something other than EU membership.
The EU reset that the Starmer government has pursued since July 2024 is a genuine attempt to reduce the friction costs that Brexit introduced — the customs checks, the regulatory divergence, the professional recognition barriers, the touring artist carnets, the data transfer restrictions — without crossing the political red lines of freedom of movement, customs union membership, or single market membership that Brexit supporters define as the substance of Brexit. The negotiation is real, the constraints are real, and the outcome so far — Horizon restored, a defence pact agreed, youth mobility under discussion — represents the pragmatic middle ground between the Brexit that was promised and the EU membership it replaced.
The Economic Consequences: What the Data Shows and What the Politics Allows You to Say About It
The economic consequences of Brexit have been documented by economists across the political spectrum with a consistency that the political debate does not always reflect. The UK in a Changing Europe’s economic analysis finds that Brexit has reduced UK trade by approximately fifteen percent compared to the counterfactual, increased trade costs for businesses, reduced foreign direct investment flows, and contributed to a productivity performance below comparable economies. The Bank of England’s modelling finds similar effects. The LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance finds similar effects. The Treasury’s own pre-Brexit modelling, published in 2016, projected effects of this order.
The political response to this evidence has been segmented: Brexit supporters dispute the counterfactual, attribute the performance to COVID, argue that long-term regulatory divergence will produce benefits not yet visible, and note that the economy has not collapsed (which was not the prediction). Brexit sceptics cite the evidence as confirmation of projected harm. The government’s position — that Brexit happened, its terms must be managed as well as possible, and relitigating the decision is politically non-viable — is the pragmatic centre that the evidence and the politics together produce. It is honest about the constraints and less honest than the economic evidence warrants about the costs.
The Single Market Gap: What Britain Gave Up and What It Got Instead
Single market membership provided British businesses with tariff-free, frictionless access to the EU market of four hundred and fifty million consumers, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, freedom of movement for workers, and participation in EU research programmes. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement replaced this with: a zero-tariff, zero-quota trade agreement for goods (but not services), no mutual recognition of professional qualifications, no freedom of movement, no EU research programme participation (until Horizon was restored), and customs declarations for all goods moving between the UK and EU.
Services — which represent approximately eighty percent of UK GDP — are largely excluded from the TCA, relying on whatever domestic regulatory equivalence decisions the EU makes unilaterally. Financial services, which had relied on passporting arrangements for EU market access, now require either EU subsidiary establishment or regulatory equivalence decisions that the EU grants at its discretion. The City of London has retained more business than some post-Brexit projections suggested, partly through adaptability and partly through the establishment of EU subsidiaries. It has lost market share in areas including euro-denominated derivatives clearing, which shifted to Amsterdam and Paris.
Youth Mobility: The Deal That Keeps Not Quite Being Agreed
Youth mobility — a reciprocal arrangement allowing under-thirties to live and work in each other’s countries for a defined period — has been under discussion between the UK and EU since 2023. The EU has proposed a scheme. The UK government has indicated interest. The political constraint is that any youth mobility scheme resembles freedom of movement sufficiently that it generates political opposition from Brexit supporters who define freedom of movement as the thing Brexit was supposed to end, regardless of the actual terms of the proposed scheme. The discussion continues. The scheme remains under negotiation. The young people who would benefit from it are observing the process with the patience of a demographic that has learned to have low expectations of the political class’s willingness to prioritise their interests.
Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!
The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement provides zero-tariff goods trade but excludes most services and contains no professional qualification mutual recognition. Horizon association was restored in 2023. The Starmer government agreed a defence and security partnership with the EU in 2025. UK in a Changing Europe estimates Brexit has reduced UK trade by approximately 15% compared to counterfactual. Financial services passporting ended with Brexit; EU subsidiaries have been established by major firms. Youth mobility discussions between the UK and EU have been ongoing since 2023 without agreement. The Windsor Framework (2023) modified the Northern Ireland Protocol’s Irish Sea arrangements. The EU reset has not restored single market or customs union membership.
Alan Nafzger was born in Lubbock, Texas, the son Swiss immigrants. He grew up on a dairy in Windthorst, north central Texas. He earned degrees from Midwestern State University (B.A. 1985) and Texas State University (M.A. 1987). University College Dublin (Ph.D. 1991). Dr. Nafzger has entertained and educated young people in Texas colleges for 37 years. Nafzger is best known for his dark novels and experimental screenwriting. His best know scripts to date are Lenin’s Body, produced in Russia by A-Media and Sea and Sky produced in The Philippines in the Tagalog language. In 1986, Nafzger wrote the iconic feminist western novel, Gina of Quitaque. He currently lives in Holloway, North London. Contact: [email protected]
Peter Cook would have read this and felt vindicated. Then he would have had several drinks and complained that nobody’s learned anything in 50 years.
Precizia limbajului birocratic este criminala. Cineva a supravie?uit unor ?edin?e adevarate.
A London person said “The London Prat is accurate. You civil servants have made it impossible to get anything done. That’s the point.”