The Grenfell Tower Fire: Housing Policy, Deregulation, and the Building That Was Not Safe and Was Not Made Safe

The Grenfell Tower Fire: Housing Policy, Deregulation, and the Building That Was Not Safe and Was Not Made Safe

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Cladding, Building Regulations, RBKC, the Inquiry, Corporate Manslaughter, and the Fire That Exposed Decades of Decisions Made Without Adequate Regard for Human Life

Grenfell: The Fire That Was Decades in the Making

On 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower — a twenty-four-storey social housing block in North Kensington, London — and spread with terrifying speed to the building’s exterior cladding, killing seventy-two people in one of the worst structural fire disasters in British peacetime history. The speed and totality of the fire’s spread was not a freak accident. It was the predictable consequence of a cladding system — aluminium composite panels with a polyethylene core — that was highly flammable, attached to insulation that was also highly combustible, and applied to a building that had no sprinklers, with fire door deficiencies and evacuation advice (“stay put”) that was catastrophically wrong for a building where the exterior was burning.

The cladding had been applied in a refurbishment costing approximately £10 million, managed by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation on behalf of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea — one of the wealthiest local authorities in England, governing a borough that contained both the tower’s social housing residents and some of the most expensive residential property in the world. The refurbishment had saved approximately £2 per square metre by choosing a cladding product that was cheaper and more flammable than the alternative. The saving was approximately £5,000. The cost, in seventy-two lives, is not calculable.

The Building Safety Failure: How a Building Is Made Unsafe by Degrees

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, examined the full chain of decisions — from the original building’s 1974 construction to the 2016 refurbishment — that produced a building unsafe for human habitation in the event of a fire. Its findings implicated: the manufacturers of the cladding and insulation, who marketed products as compliant with fire safety regulations that testing showed they failed; the architects and contractors who designed and built the refurbishment without adequate fire safety analysis; the KCTMO that managed the building without acting on residents’ fire safety concerns; the RBKC that provided insufficient oversight; the building control inspector who certified the refurbishment as compliant; and the government departments whose building regulation guidance had been progressively loosened under deregulatory pressure.

The government’s role — specifically the loosening of guidance on external fire spread in Approved Document B and the failure to act on warnings about combustible cladding — was examined by the inquiry with the care that the evidence required. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s final report, published in September 2024, found that the fire was the “culmination of decades of failure” by central and local government, building industry, and regulatory bodies, and that the deaths were “avoidable.” The finding that deaths were avoidable — that the specific combination of decisions made, guidance issued, regulations loosened, and warnings ignored had produced the outcome — is the finding whose implications for accountability and reform are still being worked through.

The Cladding Scandal: From Grenfell to Eleven Million People

The Grenfell fire revealed that combustible cladding had been applied not only to Grenfell Tower but to hundreds of residential buildings across the country — high-rises, mid-rises, and lower blocks where the same or similar products had been used in the same or similar way, producing buildings that were unsafe in the same or similar way, inhabited by people who had not been told. The subsequent building safety crisis — the identification, remediation, and financing of the defects — has affected an estimated eleven million people living in buildings with fire safety issues and produced a situation in which flat owners in affected buildings cannot sell their properties because mortgage lenders will not lend on buildings without fire safety certificates.

The government’s response — the Building Safety Act 2022, the developer remediation programme, the Building Safety Levy — has committed developers responsible for the defects to fund remediation without passing costs to leaseholders. The implementation has been slower than the scale and urgency of the problem requires, and the definition of who counts as a “developer responsible” has been contested in ways that have left some leaseholders without clear remediation routes. The Building Safety Regulator established by the Act provides ongoing oversight.

Accountability: The Question That Remains Open

No criminal prosecutions have resulted from the Grenfell fire as of 2024. The Metropolitan Police investigation — ongoing since 2017 — is examining potential charges including corporate manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter against organisations including KCTMO, RBKC, the refurbishment contractor Rydon, and the cladding manufacturers. The complexity of the evidence and the number of potential defendants have produced an investigation of unusual length. Those affected — the bereaved and survivors — have waited seven years for criminal accountability. Their wait continues.

The inquiry’s finding that the deaths were avoidable and that the fire was the product of decades of institutional failure has not yet been translated into criminal accountability for those failures. Whether it will be, and against whom, is the question that the Metropolitan Police investigation and any subsequent prosecution will answer. The inquiry has provided the facts. The law will determine the accountability. In a country where the gap between findings and consequences has been notably wide in recent institutional scandals, those awaiting that accountability have reason to be cautious about their expectations.

Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!

The Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017 killed 72 people in North Kensington, London. The fire spread through Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) cladding with a polyethylene core applied in a 2016 refurbishment. The cheaper cladding chosen saved approximately £5,000 over a safer alternative. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, published its final report in September 2024, finding the fire was “the culmination of decades of failure” and the deaths were “avoidable.” The cladding crisis affects an estimated 11 million people in buildings with fire safety defects. The Building Safety Act 2022 requires developers to fund remediation. Metropolitan Police criminal investigations — including potential corporate manslaughter charges — remained ongoing as of 2024. No criminal prosecutions had resulted seven years after the fire.

3 thoughts on “The Grenfell Tower Fire: Housing Policy, Deregulation, and the Building That Was Not Safe and Was Not Made Safe”

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