The British Armed Forces at War: From the Falklands to Afghanistan and the Questions That Remain

Post-Cold War Military Operations, Iraq Inquiry, Afghanistan Lessons, Human Rights Law in Conflict, Veterans’ Mental Health, and What Britain’s Military Has Learned From Forty Years of Continuous Operations

Forty Years of Continuous Operations: What Britain Has Learned and What It Has Not

The British Armed Forces have been engaged in continuous military operations since 1982 — the Falklands, the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Ukraine support, and numerous other deployments across four decades. This operational tempo is exceptional among comparable militaries and has produced an armed forces with genuine combat experience at every level, from private soldier to four-star general, whose practical knowledge of conflict exceeds that of most of their NATO partners. It has also produced a mental health crisis among veterans, a series of strategic failures whose lessons have been only partially absorbed, and an ongoing tension between the military’s professional experience and the political decisions that deploy it.

The Falklands War of 1982 remains the British military’s most discussed post-war campaign — a combined arms operation at extreme range that succeeded through operational competence, individual courage, and Argentine military misjudgments — and the one whose political lessons were most straightforwardly drawn: that military intervention in defence of British territory and British citizens could succeed, restore political credibility, and produce an outcome that time has not subsequently reversed. Margaret Thatcher’s government did not enter the Falklands campaign with a confident assessment of its outcome. It entered with the political necessity of response and the military’s professional assessment that success was possible. Both proved correct. The lesson — that commitment to military action requires confidence in both political necessity and military feasibility — has not been consistently applied in subsequent operations.

Iraq: The Chilcot Lessons and Their Partial Application

The Iraq War of 2003 — its decision-making, conduct, and aftermath — was examined by the Iraq Inquiry chaired by Sir John Chilcot and reported in 2016. The report found, with measured precision across seven volumes, that: the decision to commit to military action was made before the diplomatic and legal processes were exhausted; the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was presented with more certainty than the evidence warranted; military planning was inadequate for the post-conflict environment; and the consequences for Iraq — the breakdown of state order, the sectarian violence, the rise of ISIS from the vacuum — were foreseeable from the available evidence and were not adequately considered in the decision-making process.

The lessons of Chilcot have been partially institutionalised — the National Security Council, created in 2010, provides more structured government consideration of major security decisions than the bilateral Blair-style sofa government that produced the Iraq commitment. They have been less fully institutionalised in the appetite for early, optimistic assumptions about military intervention’s capacity to resolve complex political situations — an appetite that subsequent Libya and Syria interventions suggest has not been extinguished by Iraq’s example.

Afghanistan: The Longest Campaign and Its Conclusion

Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 — the longest sustained military campaign in British history — cost 457 military lives, several thousand casualties, and approximately £37 billion, and concluded with the Taliban returning to power in August 2021 within weeks of Western forces’ withdrawal. The campaign achieved the initial objective of dismantling Al-Qaeda’s Afghan base after 9/11. It did not achieve the subsequent objective of producing a stable, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan state — an objective whose ambitious scope and insufficient resourcing the government’s own assessments had questioned at various points during the campaign.

The lessons of Afghanistan — about the limits of military power in state-building, the necessity of political strategy alongside military strategy, the importance of understanding the political culture of the country being operated in, and the gap between Western time horizons and the patience of insurgencies operating on generational timescales — are available from the campaign record. Whether they have been absorbed in a form that would change future decision-making is the question that the next major military commitment will answer, rather than the question that academic and official reviews can settle in advance.

Veterans: The Obligation That Is Easier to Announce Than to Deliver

The Armed Forces Covenant — the government’s commitment to ensuring veterans are not disadvantaged by their service — is the most comprehensive statement of obligation to former service personnel in British history. Its practical implementation — in NHS treatment, housing priority, employment support, and mental health services — has been assessed by the Confederation of Service Charities and others as uneven: strong in some areas, inadequate in others, and persistently challenged by the fragmentation of responsibility across NHS trusts, local authorities, and government departments that lack coordinated accountability for its delivery.

Veterans’ mental health — PTSD, depression, and alcohol dependency rates higher than the general population for specific service groups — is the most significant unmet need, not because services do not exist but because the stigma of seeking help within a military culture, the identification of need, and the transition to civilian mental health services after discharge collectively produce gaps between the need and its recognition and treatment. The Armed Forces Covenant is a commitment. Delivering it consistently and measurably remains a work in progress.

Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!

Britain has been engaged in continuous military operations since 1982. The Falklands War (1982) cost 255 British military lives. The Iraq War Inquiry (Chilcot Report, 2016) found the decision to invade was made before legal and diplomatic processes were exhausted and that post-conflict planning was wholly inadequate. Afghanistan (2001-2021) cost 457 British military lives and approximately £37 billion; the Taliban returned to power within weeks of Western withdrawal in August 2021. The National Security Council was established in 2010 to provide more structured government oversight of major security decisions. The Armed Forces Covenant commits to ensuring veterans are not disadvantaged by their service; its implementation is assessed as uneven. Veterans’ mental health needs — including PTSD and alcohol dependency — are higher than in the general population for specific service groups.

Alan Nafzger

Alan Nafzger was born in Lubbock, Texas, the son Swiss immigrants. He grew up on a dairy in Windthorst, north central Texas. He earned degrees from Midwestern State University (B.A. 1985) and Texas State University (M.A. 1987). University College Dublin (Ph.D. 1991). Dr. Nafzger has entertained and educated young people in Texas colleges for 37 years. Nafzger is best known for his dark novels and experimental screenwriting. His best know scripts to date are Lenin’s Body, produced in Russia by A-Media and Sea and Sky produced in The Philippines in the Tagalog language. In 1986, Nafzger wrote the iconic feminist western novel, Gina of Quitaque. He currently lives in Holloway, North London. Contact: [email protected]